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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 5, 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(“China”) submitted a request for consultations (“complaint”) to the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) alleging that Italy’s feed-in-
tariff program (“FIT Program” or “FIT”) is inconsistent with Italy’s 
obligations under three WTO Agreements.1 First, China has alleged 
that the Italian FIT Program violates certain provisions of both the 
1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT 1994”)2 and 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs 
Agreement”) by providing solar-photovoltaic (“solar-PV”) 
generators and components made in the European Union with an 
advantage that is unavailable to solar-PV generators and components 
made outside of the European Union.3 To substantiate this allegation, 
 
 1.  See Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain 
Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector, WT/DS452/1 at 1 (Nov. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Consultations]. 
 2.  See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] (establishing that no measure 
may impose less favorable treatment upon imported products than that granted to 
like products of domestic origin). 
 3.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (claiming that the Italian FIT 
Program violates Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement because those TRIMs 
provide an advantage to domestic goods unavailable to imported goods). See 
generally Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
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China has pointed to the Fourth and Fifth Italian Energy Bills, in 
which the Italian legislature agrees to grant ten percent subsidies on 
electricity produced by solar-PV generators so long as the generators 
consist of certain components made in the European Union.4 Second, 
China has alleged that the Italian FIT Program violates certain 
provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (“SCM Agreement”) by providing a prohibited subsidy 
conditioned upon the use of domestic solar-PV components over 
imported components.5 As evidence of this allegation, China has 
submitted that the Italian Government sets a price, guaranteed for 
twenty years, at which it purchases the electricity produced by Italian 
solar-PV generators.6 China has claimed that Italy’s guaranteed 
purchase of solar-based electricity confers a “benefit” upon those 
solar-PV generators because the guaranteed purchase provides more 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 
I.L.M. 1153 [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement] (stating that measures requiring the 
purchase of products of domestic origin are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the 
GATT 1994). China also alleged that the Italian FIT Program violated the “most-
favored-nation” principle enshrined in Article I of the GATT 1994, and the 
principle disfavoring protectionist measures in Article III:1 of the GATT 1994. 
Due to the lack of current case law analyzing these principles, however, this 
comment will focus solely upon the alleged violation of Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 
 4.  See Decreto Ministeriale 5 luglio 2012, n. 143, in G.U. 10 luglio 2012, n. 
159 (It.), arts. 4(5)(d), 5(2)(a) (stating that solar-PV units whose primary 
components were made in the European Union or the European Economic Area 
will receive some degree of priority in determining their eligibility to receive an 
extra (1) 20 €/MWh if in use by December 31, 2013; (2) 10 €/MWh if in use by 
December 31, 2014; or (3) 5 €/MWh if in use after December 31, 2014). Decreto 
Ministeriale 5 maggio 2011, n. 238, in G.U. 12 maggio 2011, n. 109 (It.), art. 
14(1)(d) (raising the purchasing price for electricity from solar-PV units by ten 
percent if at least sixty percent of the total production cost derives from 
components made in the European Union). 
 5.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (alleging that the Italian FIT Program 
is prohibited under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement because it 
provides a benefit “contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods”). 
See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, 33 I.L.M. 1153, arts. 3.1(b), 3.2 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement] 
(prohibiting subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods). 
 6.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that the issues which China 
would like to raise in the course of consultations include, but are not limited to, 
Italy’s Fifth and Fourth Energy Bills). Both the Fifth and Fourth Feed-in Schemes 
provide that incentives will apply for twenty years. See D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 5.4; 
D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 12.2. 
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than adequate remuneration for the electricity that the generators 
produce, which is prohibited under the SCM Agreement.7 Italy had 
sixty days from the date of submission of China’s complaint to 
respond to China’s allegations; because the parties have failed to 
reach an agreement, China may now request that the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body establish a panel to review its grievances.8 
China’s complaint to the WTO has important implications for the 
development of WTO jurisprudence. From a legal standpoint, the 
complaint raises the question of whether WTO Member States may 
use policy tools to pursue national human health and environmental 
initiatives if those initiatives conflict with the free-trade principles of 
the WTO.9 A majority of EU Member States have already adopted 
FIT Programs in pursuit of similar national initiatives;10 yet, despite 
the widespread use of FITs, to date, only one WTO case has 
addressed the consistency of the FIT with the WTO Agreements.11 
 
 7.  See SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii), (b) (establishing that a subsidy 
exists when a government purchases goods in such a way that confers a “benefit” 
on the seller). 
 8.  See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 4.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (stating that 
the complainant may request that the WTO establish a panel if the parties fail to 
settle a dispute following sixty-day consultations). See generally European Union 
and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds452_e.htm (last updated Dec. 18, 2012) (listing the dates of the requests for 
consultations). 
 9.  See M.S. Srikar, Renewable Energy Programmes in the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States 10 (Ctr. for WTO Studies, Working Paper No. 200/4, 
2012) (observing that state support of renewable energy policies inconsistent with 
WTO law represents a source of trade friction). 
 10.  See Conference Report, 8th Workshop of the Int’l Feed-In Cooperation 
(Nov. 18–19, 2010), http://www.feed-in-cooperation.org/wDefault_7/content/8th-
workshop/index.php (follow “Conclusions” hyperlink) (stating that twenty-three of 
twenty-seven EU Member States use FIT programs to incentivize use of renewable 
energy sources and that nearly 100% of all new solar-PV units since 1997 have 
been installed in countries using FITs). 
 11.  See Marie Wilke, Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO Subsidy 
Rules: An Initial Legal Review 1 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. 
Programme on Trade and Envt., Issue Paper No. 4, 2011), available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/112508/?view=document/ (highlighting that the first 
complaint addressing the legality of FITs in the WTO was submitted in September 
2010 and that the case focused primarily on the domestic content requirement and 
the subsidy nature of the FIT). See generally Panel Reports, Canada – Certain 
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As other WTO Member States adopt their own FIT Programs,12 more 
complaints are likely to follow, and the demand for clear, instructive 
WTO jurisprudence will only grow.13 For this reason, legal 
scholarship evaluating the legality of the FIT Program would provide 
much-needed direction to WTO Member States as they tailor their 
FITs to comply with the WTO covered agreements.14 
Given the unclear legal status of the FIT Program, this comment 
evaluates and predicts the outcome of the current dispute before the 
WTO. It explores the manner in which the Italian FIT Program likely 
violates Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of the 
GATT 1994 by mandating that solar-PV generators use a certain 
percentage of EU-made solar-PV components to be eligible for an 
increase in the sale price of the electricity that they produce. The 
same FIT Program, however, is unlikely to violate Articles 3.1(b) 
and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement because it may fail to confer a 
“benefit” upon solar-PV generators as required by Article 1.1(b), and 
therefore, it will not constitute a subsidy. 
Part II of this comment begins by providing an overview of the 
tariff supplied within the Italian FIT Program through the 
Renewables Decree and the Fourth and Fifth Italian Energy Bills. 
This part also reviews Canada – Measures, the only case in which a 
WTO panel has assessed the consistency of a FIT with the WTO 
covered agreements. Lastly, Part II concludes by defining the 
 
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector, WT/DS412/R; Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012) 
[hereinafter Canada – Measures Panel Report], rev’d in part, Appellate Body 
Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector, ¶ 6.1, WT/DS412/AB/R; Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff 
Program, ¶ 6.1, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013) [hereinafter Canada – Measures 
Appellate Body Report] (ruling that the Ontario FIT Program is inconsistent with 
the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement, but not the SCM Agreement). 
 12.  See Wilke, supra note 11, at vi (observing that eighty countries have 
adopted various measures to support renewable energy production, the most 
common measure being the FIT). 
 13.  See Srikar, supra note 9, at 25, 168–69 (positing that the success of FIT 
schemes around the world makes renewable-energy-incentive programs a “fertile 
ground” for WTO litigation by countries like India). 
 14.  Cf. WTO Rules Ontario Green Energy Tariff Unfair, CBC NEWS, Nov. 19, 
2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/11/19/wto-green-energy.html 
(highlighting that the Canada – Measures case is viewed as a trial by governments 
to favor local producers who promote renewable energy projects). 
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obligations originating within the relevant articles of the GATT 
1994, TRIMs Agreement, and SCM Agreement, which the Panel 
would apply in the instant dispute. 
Part III begins by arguing that the Italian FIT Program likely 
violates the national treatment obligation of Article III:4 of the 
GATT 1994 within the scope of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 as well as the 
Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement. Part III also argues, 
however, that the Italian FIT Program may not confer a “benefit” as 
defined by Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement because the Italian 
Government has pared down its FIT Program to provide increasingly 
less remuneration to solar-PV generation companies in the Italian 
market. 
Part IV recommends that Italy (a) appeal any prospective WTO 
Panel Decision to the Appellate Body and prepare responses to 
China’s counterarguments; (b) remove the domestic content 
requirement from its FIT Program as requested by the WTO; or (c) 
seek to phase out its FIT Program altogether in search of less costly 
alternatives. Lastly, Part V concludes that Italy will continue to 
degress its tariff rates and pare down its FIT Program because of the 
burden of the FIT on taxpayers and Italy’s sovereign debt crisis. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 2011, Italy was the world’s second largest market for solar-PV 
energy,15 behind only Germany.16 Italy’s prominence in the solar-PV 
arena only continues to grow, especially now that Italian individuals 
increasingly purchase small-model solar-PV plants.17 Italy’s 
increased production of solar-PV generators has promoted clean, 
 
 15.  See Photovoltaic Barometer, EUROBSERV’ER 58 (2013), available at 
http://www.energies-renouvelables.org/observ-er/stat_baro/observ/baro-jdp9.pdf 
(calculating that in 2011 Italy added 9303 MWp to its solar-PV capacity, more 
than any other EU Member State that year). 
 16.  See id. at 59 (reporting Italy’s total solar-PV capacity at 12,783 MWp and 
16,361 MWp in 2011 and 2012, respectively, with Germany’s capacity at 25,094 
MWp and 32,698 MWp for the same years). 
 17.  See Rapporto Statistico 2011: Solare Fotovoltaico, GESTORE DEI SERVIZI 
ENERGETICI 8 (2011), available at http://www.gse.it/it/Statistiche/ 
RapportiStatistici/Pagine/default.aspx (follow “Solare Fotovoltaico - Rapporto 
Statistico 2011” hyperlink) [hereinafter Italian Solar Generation] (stating that 
units with less than 200 kW accounted for ninety-seven percent of total 
installments and one-third of Italy’s total solar-PV capacity). 
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renewable energy sources, while also serving to fill the void in 
electricity supply left by Italy’s own rejection of nuclear energy.18 As 
one of the largest national economies in the world to renounce 
nuclear power,19 Italy has resorted to solar-PV energy through its FIT 
Program to produce enough electricity to meet its consumption 
needs.20 Yet, because the FIT Program allegedly favors the use of 
domestic components over imported ones, China has argued that the 
FIT violates certain provisions of the GATT 1994, the TRIMs 
Agreement, and the SCM Agreement.21 To grasp the range of 
China’s arguments, this comment begins by establishing a basic 
understanding of the Italian FIT Program, its legislative and 
ministerial underpinnings, and its coherence within the framework of 
the WTO covered agreements. 
A. LEGISLATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ITALIAN FIT PROGRAM 
1. Italian Legislative Decree on Renewable Sources 
On March 3, 2011, the Italian Parliament published Legislative 
Decree No. 28/2011 (“Decree”),22 which positioned Italy to reach its 
 
 18.  See Craig Morris, Italy Rejects Nuclear Power, RENEWABLES INT’L (June 
13, 2011), http://www.renewablesinternational.net/italy-rejects-nuclear-
power/150/537/31171 (reporting that Berlusconi acknowledged that Italy must turn 
to renewable energy after rejecting nuclear power). 
 19.  See id. (reporting that, as of 2011, Italy was the world’s largest national 
economy with a nuclear-free generating capacity and noting that Germany, 
Austria, and Switzerland are also phasing out nuclear power). 
 20.  See Statistical Report 2011: Renewable Power Plants in Italy, GESTORE 
DEI SERVIZI ENERGETICI, 7 (2011), available at http://www.gse.it/en/ 
dataandfinancialstatement/Pages/default.aspx (follow “Download Statistical 
Report 2011 (pdf)” hyperlink) [hereinafter GSE Report 2011] (showing that in 
2010 and 2011, Italy consumed 342,933 GWh and 346,368 GWh of electricity, 
respectively, while its actual solar-PV generation jumped from 1906 to 10,266 
GWh—a 466.5% increase); see also Stefania Gorgoglione, The New Italian 
Legislation on Renewable Energy, 3 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y 205, 205 
(2012) (observing that as of June 2010, Italy met its objective when renewable 
energy sources accounted for nearly twenty-six percent of total national electricity 
consumption). 
 21.  Consultations, supra note 1, at 3. 
 22.  See The Renewables Decree: Introduction of a New System of Incentives 
for Renewable Energy Plants, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PublicationDetail&pub=
5468&PublicationTypes=d9093adb-e95d-4f19-819a-f0bb5170ab6d (announcing 
that the Decree will replace the previous FIT structure and will take effect on 
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benchmark for use of renewable energy sources by 2020.23 The 
Decree established several incentives to encourage increased 
production of electricity from solar-PV generators, including (1) a 
fixed price for the purchase of electricity, independent of market 
value, to provide owners of generators with a fair return on their 
investments; (2) twenty-year FIT contracts equal in duration to the 
lifetime of the generators, under which the Italian Government will 
purchase the solar-PV-based electricity; (3) a guarantee that the 
Italian Government will purchase electricity and feed it into the grid; 
and (4) long-term market stability for investors.24 
Under the framework of the Decree, the Italian Government 
utilizes a number of public utilities to execute its FIT Program. 
Companies such as Italy’s largest utility, ENEL S.p.A., and its 
subsidiary, ENEL Green Power, both of which are publicly owned,25 
develop the technologies and build the solar-PV generators that 
allow both households and businesses to produce electricity for 
national consumption.26 In turn, the public utility company Gestore 
 
January 1, 2013). See generally Decreto Legislativo 3 marzo 2011, n. 81/L, in G.U. 
28 marzo 2011, n. 28 (It.) (implementing EU Directive 2009/28/CE to promote the 
use of renewable energy). 
 23.  See Council Directive 2009/28, 99 Annex I.A, 2009 O.J. (L 140/16) Annex 
I (EC) (providing that Italy shall increase the share of its total electricity 
consumption produced by renewable energy sources from 5.2% in 2005 to 17% by 
2020). 
 24.  See Srikar, supra note 9, at 21–22 (detailing how renewable energy 
producers receive a long-term premium for the electricity they produce and that 
electric grid utilities are obligated to purchase the electricity to guarantee 
producers a reasonable return on their investment); see also Michael E. Streich, 
Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009: A “Fit”-ing Policy for North 
America?, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 419, 425–26 (2011) (noting that utility companies 
pay generation companies more than the wholesale price of non-renewable energy 
to promote the social and environmental benefits of renewable energy and to 
defray initial investment costs with respect to developing renewable energy 
projects). 
 25.  See About Us, ENEL, http://www.enel.com/en-GB/group/about_us/ (last 
updated June 30, 2013) [hereinafter About Us, ENEL] (stating that the Italian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance holds 31.24% of Enel’s shares); see also Adam 
L. Freeman & Flavia Krause Jackson, Cassa Depositi Given More Time to Sell 
Enel or Terna Stake, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 12, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1LMEGqQCUHI 
(reporting that the Italian state-backed bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti owns about 
ten percent of Enel).  
 26.  See Solar Power, ENEL GREEN POWER, http://www.enelgreenpower.com/ 
en-GB/plants/renewable_energy/solar/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) 
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Servizi Energetici (“GSE”)27 purchases the electricity from the solar-
PV generators at a set price per kilowatt hour (“kWh”).28 ENEL 
distributes the electricity through an extensive network of 
transmission and distribution assets,29 as does the publicly-owned 
electricity-transmission operator Terna Rete Italia,30 which controls 
ninety-eight percent of the national power grid in Italy.31 
In effect, the FIT Program acts as a purchasing guarantee, for both 
owners of solar-PV generators and investors.32 Because GSE is 
required to purchase electricity generated from solar-PV energy,33 
and the prices that the government sets are generally high,34 solar-PV 
 
(describing how Enel S.p.A. promotes innovation in the field of PV technology, 
particularly through its subsidiary Enel Green Power Retail). 
 27.  See Statuto del “Gestore dei Servizi Energetici – GSE S.p.A.”, art. 8 
(adopted pursuant to Decreto Legislativo 16 marzo 1999, n. 79 (It.)), available at 
http://www.gse.it/it/Azienda/GSE_Documenti/Azienda/Missione/Documenti/Mode
llo%20organizzativo/Statuto_GSE2010.pdf [hereinafter GSE S.p.A.] (providing 
that the sole owner of GSE is the Ministry of Economy and Finance (“MEF”) and 
that the MEF exercises its shareholder rights jointly with the Ministry of Economic 
Development). 
 28.  See GSE Report 2011, supra note 20, at 53 (stating that GSE purchases 
electricity from renewable energy sources and then trades and resells the 
electricity). 
 29.  See About Us, ENEL, supra note 25 (stating that Enel distributes electricity 
through a network of 1.9 million km to serve approximately sixty-one million 
customers). 
 30.  See About Terna Rete Italia, TERNA RETE ITALIA, 
http://www.ternareteitalia.it/default_eng.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) 
(highlighting that, as a grid management and transmission operator, Terna Rete 
Italia manages the flow of electricity along 63,500 km of high-voltage lines of the 
Italian electricity system); see also Transmitting Energy, Transmitting Values, 
TERNA GROUP, http://www.terna.it/default.aspx?tabid=1778 (last updated July 24, 
2013) (reporting that Terna’s major shareholder is Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, with 
29.85% of shares). 
 31.  Terna S.p.A. Company Information, HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/ 
company-information/cs/company-profile.Terna_SpA.614f1537e7f27283.html 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Terna S.p.A. Company Information]; see 
also About Terna Rete Italia, supra note 30 (reporting that Terna also manages 468 
transforming and switching stations in Italy).  
 32.  See Wilke, supra note 11 (conceptualizing the FIT Program as a 
purchasing guarantee because the electric grid utilities are obligated to purchase 
electricity from the renewable energy producers, which guarantees the producers a 
return on their investment). 
 33.  See Streich, supra note 24, at 425–26 (stating that FITs require utility 
companies to purchase electricity from renewable sources at a government-fixed 
“premium” rate for a guaranteed number of years). 
 34.  See Paul Gipe, New Italian Tariffs Complex and Robust, RENEWABLE 
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generators are guaranteed to receive a return on their investment 
involving little or no risk.35 Investors are also more likely to support 
renewable-energy-generation projects because they, too, will receive 
a return on their investments.36 Thus, both generators and investors 
earn a return, and the Italian Government may further its own policy 
objectives.37 
In light of the positive effect of the Decree’s incentives on solar-
PV generation, China has argued that the incentives play a pivotal 
role in the effectuation of the FIT Program within Italy.38 According 
to Article 25(10), the Italian Government determines its FIT levels 
according to the incentives provided to solar-PV generators in other 
EU Member States.39 China has raised this issue in light of the 
Decree’s role in implementing the Fourth and Fifth Energy Bills.40 
2. Fourth Energy Bill 
On May 5, 2011, the Italian Ministry of Economic Development 
decreed the Fourth Energy Bill,41 in which it instituted annual 
 
ENERGY WORLD (July 9, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/ 
article/2011/07/new-italian-tariffs-complex-and-robust-2000-mw-may-be-
installed-in-2011 [hereinafter Gipe, New Italian Tariffs] (emphasizing that despite 
reports that the new Italian FIT program dramatically cuts tariffs, the tariffs remain 
fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs when adjusted for high 
levels of sunshine). 
 35.  See Srikar, supra note 9, at 23 (stating that guaranteed prices, network 
connections, and purchases lead to an “almost risk-free contract”). 
 36.  See id. at 22 (stating that the level and duration of guaranteed support has 
been crucial to attract investors and to increase exploitation of renewable energy 
sources). 
 37.  See id. at 9 (noting that these objectives include (1) environmental 
protection; (2) reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and use of nuclear power; 
(3) enhanced energy supply security; (4) reduced dependence on fossil fuels; and 
(5) enhanced economic competition and job creation). 
 38.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 1 (alleging that the incentives created 
by the Decree directly relate to the implementation of the Feed-in Schemes in the 
Fourth and Fifth Energy Bills). 
 39.  See D.Lgs. n. 28/2011, art. 25.10(b) (providing that a new Feed-in Scheme 
will determine tariff levels based on reductions in technology costs and the 
incentives applied by other EU Member States). 
 40.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 2 (advancing that the Renewables 
Decree incentivizes the production of electrical energy from solar-PV 
installations). 
 41.  See Italy Issues Fourth Conto Energia: New Feed-In Tariffs for 
Production of Photovoltaic Energy in 2011-2016, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY 7 
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reductions, or degressions, in the FITs for its new solar-PV 
generators.42 The tariff degression provides incentives for 
technological improvements that lower production costs and 
minimize the oversupply of electricity fed into the grid.43 Ultimately, 
degression allows renewable energy sources to achieve grid-parity 
with traditional energy sources, rendering future FIT support of 
renewable energy generators unnecessary.44 
In terms of its WTO-consistency, however, China has taken issue 
with Article 14(1)(d) of the Fourth Energy Bill,45 which states that 
solar-PV generators will receive a ten-percent increase in the price 
paid for the electricity they produce, so long as sixty percent of the 
components used to construct the generators is sourced within the 
European Union or the European Economic Area.46 This type of 
provision, known as a domestic content requirement (“DCR”), 
supports local producers of solar-PV components.47 The DCR 
 
(2011), available at www.mwe.com/info/news/wp0511a.pdf [hereinafter Italy 
Issues Fourth Conto Energia] (indicating that one overall feed-in tariff will apply 
in the 2013 Fourth Feed-in Scheme, which combines the electricity base price and 
the premium). See generally D.M. n. 238/2011 (marking Italy’s response to EU 
Directive 2009/28/CE and to the Renewables Decree); see also id. arts. 11.2(a), 
15.2(a), 17.2(a) (providing that the Fourth Bill Feed-in Scheme applies to units 
with a capacity of at least 1 kW commissioned between June 1, 2011 and 
December 31, 2016). 
 42.  See Arne Klein et al., Evaluation of Different Feed-in-Tariff Design 
Options – Best Practice Paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation, ENERGY 
ECON. GRP., 40, 43 (2008), http://www.feed-in-cooperation.org/wDefault_7/ 
wDefault_7/download-files/research/best_practice_paper_2nd_edition_final.pdf 
(stating that, beginning in 2007, Italy reduced its FITs for electricity from new 
solar-PV units by two percent annually to balance public support levels and energy 
costs). 
 43.  See id. at 40, 43 (adding that degression incorporates technological 
learning into renewable energy policy by leading to greater efficiency, 
transparency, and security for potential investors). 
 44.  See Mark Fulton et al., FiTs Adjust While Delivering Scale in 2010, 
DEUTSCHE BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS 2–3, http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/ 
EN/_media/DBCCA_Fit_Update_20100727.pdf (arguing that an FIT with an 
established degression scheme should allow renewable energy to reach grid-parity 
with fossil fuels by reducing the cost of capital over time, lowering the price of 
energy in a transparent way, and easing barriers to entry). 
 45.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 1 (claiming that Article 14(1)(d) 
incentivizes the use of solar-PV components in contravention of the GATT 1994, 
the TRIMs Agreement, and the SCM Agreement). 
 46.  See D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d). 
 47.  Cf. Kenina Lee, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and a 
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provides that solar-PV generators that use certain quantities or types 
of components manufactured in the European Union will qualify for 
an increase in the wholesale price of the electricity they produce.48 
3. Fifth Energy Bill 
On July 5, 2012, the Italian Minister of Economic Development 
passed the Fifth Energy Bill, which entered into force on August 27, 
2012.49 Like the Fourth Energy Bill, the Fifth Energy Bill instructs 
GSE to award premiums on top of FITs for generators whose 
modules and inverters have been manufactured in either the 
European Union or the European Economic Area.50 Article 2(1)(v) of 
the Fifth Energy Bill and GSE’s Implementing Rules to the Fifth 
Energy Bill51 both specify that solar-PV generators must certify the 
EU/EEA origin of their components to qualify for the extra 
premium.52 
 
Sustainable Future? Evaluating the Consistency of Canadian and Chinese 
Renewable Energy Policies with WTO Trade Law, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
57, 66 (2012) (arguing that compliance with the DCR in the Ontario FIT Program 
provided manufacturers of solar-PV components with an advantage, such as a set 
price paid for the electricity that the projects generate). 
 48.  Italy Issues Fourth Conto Energia, supra note 41, at 2.  
 49.  See Fifth Feed-In Scheme, GESTORE SERVIZI ENERGETICI, 
http://www.gse.it/en/feedintariff/Photovoltaic/FifthFeed-
inScheme/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Oct. 22, 2012) (stating that the Fifth 
Bill Feed-in Scheme went into effect on August 27, 2012, but that the Fourth Bill 
Feed-in Scheme will continue to apply for small solar-PV units commissioned 
before that date and for large units commissioned within seven months of the 
relevant ranking list). See generally D.M. n. 143/2012 (phasing out the Fourth Bill 
Feed-in Scheme and adding new incentives to the FIT). 
 50.  See D.M. n. 143/2012, arts. 4(5)(d), 5(2)(a) (stating that solar-PV 
generators whose primary components were made in the European Union or 
European Economic Area will receive an extra (1) 20 €/MWh if in use by 
December 31, 2013; (2) 10 €/MWh if in use by December 31, 2014; and (3) 5 
€/MWh if in use after December 31, 2014). 
 51.  See Regole Applicative per L’Iscrizione ai Registri e per L’Accesso alle 
Tariffe Incentivanti DM 5 Luglio 2012 (Quinto Conto Energia), GESTORE SERVIZI 
ENERGETICI, 34 (2012), available at http://www.gse.it/it/Conto%20Energia/GSE_ 
Documenti/Fotovoltaico/03%20Documenti/REGOLE%20APPLICATIVE_CE%2
05_07082012.pdf (noting that various types of modules and inverters used in solar-
PV units must be certified using identification codes and serial numbers to 
determine whether they were manufactured within the European Union or 
European Economic Area). 
 52.  See D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 2(1)(v) (indicating that the modules and 
conversion groups must have the typical characteristics of EU/EEA solar-PV 
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B. THE ONTARIO FIT PROGRAM IN CANADA – MEASURES 
To evaluate the legality of the Italian FIT Program, this comment 
applies to the present case the factual and analytical framework from 
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector 
(“Canada – Measures”), the only case in which the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body has evaluated the legality of an FIT Program.53 Like 
the Italian FIT Program, the FIT Program at issue in Canada – 
Measures was a government-run program.54 The Ontario Power 
Authority (“OPA”), as a publicly-directed utility,55 set FIT rates and 
administered the FIT contracts and twenty-year guarantees for the 
sale price of electricity that the renewable energy generators 
produced.56 The renewable energy generators then entered into a 
contractual relationship with several groups, including local 
distribution networks, to ensure that the generators were able to feed 
their electricity into Ontario’s electricity grid.57 As a public 
company,58 Hydro One then operated the distribution networks, 
worked with other local distribution companies to connect the 
generator to the network and manage the feed-in process, and sold 
the electricity to consumers.59 Once the consumers received 
 
modules and conversion groups). 
 53.  See also Wilke, supra note 11, at vi (highlighting that the Canada – 
Measures case analyzes the legality of the DCR as a protectionist measure and the 
FIT Program as a subsidy). 
 54.  See Streich, supra note 24, at 434–35 (stating that Ontario’s FIT Program 
standardizes rules, regulations, contractual provisions, and electricity prices to 
facilitate the development of renewable electricity generation). 
 55.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.195 (stating that 
the OPA, acting under the authority of the Electricity Act and the Green Energy 
and Green Economy Act, launched the FIT Program at the direction of the Ontario 
Minister of Energy). 
 56.  See id. ¶¶ 7.64–7.65 (finding that the OPA sets twenty or forty-year 
contracts and pays a set price per kWh of electricity fed into the Ontario electricity 
system); see also Wilke, supra note 11, at 3 (adding that the OPA handles the 
development and administration of the program, which includes price-setting and 
contract administration). 
 57.  Wilke, supra note 11, at 4. 
 58.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.34 (noting that 
Hydro One, a Crown Corporation owned one-hundred percent by the Ontario 
Government, holds and operates ninety-seven percent of the transmission and 
distribution systems). 
 59.  See id. ¶¶ 7.147, 7.149 (establishing that Hydro One distributes the 
electricity to almost one-third of the consumers in Ontario and was designed by the 
Ontarian Government to make returns from its electricity transmission and 
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electricity, the Government of Ontario then paid the FIT rates to the 
generators on the basis of the contracts that the OPA established.60 
On the Government’s behalf, the OPA used the FIT Program to 
jumpstart green industries, reduce emissions, promote job creation, 
and create a diverse mix of energy supply—particularly as Ontarians 
had decided to close several coal-fired power generators.61 To secure 
these objectives, the Government of Ontario instituted a “Minimum 
Required Domestic Content Level,”62 a DCR that requires at least 
sixty percent of the components used in renewable-energy generators 
participating in the FIT to be sourced from Ontario.63 The facilities 
that failed to meet the DCR defaulted on their contractual obligations 
and were no longer able to qualify for the FIT Program.64 
When the panel ruled on the legality of the Ontario FIT Program, 
it found that the DCR violated Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, 
as well as the national treatment obligation in Article III:4 of the 
GATT 1994, by mandating that Ontarian generators use components 
sourced from Canada to gain the advantage associated with the FIT 
Program.65 The panel also found that the Ontario FIT Program did 
not constitute a subsidy because the complainants failed to prove that 
the FIT Program conferred a “benefit” onto owners of solar-PV 
generators under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.66 On appeal, 
 
distribution); see also Wilke, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that local distribution 
companies and transmission asset-owners work with electricity producers to 
connect to the network and manage the feed-in program). 
 60.  See Wilke, supra note 11, at 3 (elaborating that the FIT premiums are paid 
on the basis of the supplier contract between OPA and the providers). 
 61.  Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.65. 
 62.  See id. ¶ 7.161 (listing the various FIT and microFIT contracts and their 
respective domestic content requirements). 
 63.  Id. ¶¶ 7.158–7.161 (providing an overview of the Japanese position on the 
DCR).  
 64.  See id. ¶¶ 7.164–7.166 (determining that the “Minimum Required 
Domestic Content Level” is a “necessary condition and prerequisite” for an 
electricity producer to participate in the FIT Program and that failure to meet the 
required content level renders the producer in breach of its contractual obligations). 
 65.  See id. ¶ 7.166 (finding that the “Minimum Required Domestic Content 
Level” violated Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of GATT 
1994 because (1) it involved the purchase or use of components from a domestic 
source, Canada, within the meaning of Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List; and 
(2) compliance with the DCR was necessary to participate in the FIT Program, an 
advantage within the meaning of Paragraph 1(a)). 
 66.  See id. ¶¶ 7.312, 7.328 (finding that the Ontario FIT Program did not 
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the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding concerning the 
inconsistency of the DCR with the provisions of the GATT 1994 and 
the TRIMs Agreement67 but overturned the panel’s finding that the 
Ontario FIT did not confer a “benefit” under Article 1.1(b).68 Canada 
– Measures is not binding upon future panels because the WTO does 
not adhere to stare decisis; nevertheless, the success of the WTO 
dispute settlement system hinges upon adherence to the provisions in 
the covered agreements as interpreted by prior panels and the 
Appellate Body.69 Because of the unique nature of the panel’s and 
Appellate Body’s analysis in Canada – Measures,70 this Comment 
uses the Canada – Measures dispute as a guide in evaluating whether 
the Italian FIT Program violates the WTO covered agreements. Like 
Japan and the European Union in Canada – Measures, China has 
challenged the FIT DCR under Article III:4 of GATT 1994 and 
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement,71 as well as the FIT support 
 
constitute a subsidy because it did not confer a “benefit” within the meaning of 
Article 1.1(b), particularly given the fundamental role of electricity in modern life, 
the failure of wholesale electricity markets to attract sufficient investment, and the 
below-market price for electricity produced from renewable energy sources). 
 67.  Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 6.1(b)(v) 
(finding, with respect to the case of Japan, that the FIT Program is not covered by 
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 and that, as a result, the panel’s conclusion that 
the Minimum Required Domestic Content Levels prescribed under the FIT 
Program are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994 stands). 
 68.  Id. ¶¶ 5.219–5.220. 
 69.  See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 108–09, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) 
(explaining that panels and the Appellate Body are influenced—though not 
formally bound—by previous Dispute Settlement Body decisions); Panel Report, 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 6.10, WT/DS8/R (July 11, 1996) 
(acknowledging that GATT and WTO panel reports create legitimate expectations 
among WTO Members and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are 
relevant to any dispute); see also Panel Report, United States – Continued 
Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶¶ 7.93, 7.175, WT/350/R 
(Oct. 1, 2008) (noting Norway’s argument that even though panels are not bound 
by previous findings of the Appellate Body, predictability and stability require that 
rules be interpreted consistently to build on previous decisions and to avoid 
unconsidered departures from previous interpretations).  
 70.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.122 (noting that 
Canada – Measures is the first case in which a panel has been asked to interpret 
and apply Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994). 
 71.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that, under Article III:4 of 
the GATT 1994, the FIT DCR grants less favorable treatment to like products of 
imported origin than to domestic origin, and that under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the 
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network for renewable energy sources under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 
of the SCM Agreement.72 
C. THE WTO AGREEMENTS 
1. Articles 1, 2.1, and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement 
Under Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement, the WTO defines 
TRIMs as “investment measures related to trade in goods only.”73 
For the Italian FIT DCR to constitute a TRIM, it would need to 
encourage investment in the production of solar-PV generation 
components74 and favor the components sourced from the European 
Union or the European Economic Area over those imported from 
abroad.75 Evidence of favorable treatment includes companies either 
moving to Italy and other EU/EEA Member States to take advantage 
of the DCR or remaining in Italy and renewing their focus in 
renewable energy generation.76 
If the prospective WTO Panel determines that the Italian FIT DCR 
constitutes a TRIM, it will likely analyze Article 2.1 of the TRIMs 
Agreement in making its determination.77 According to Article 2.1, 
no WTO Member may apply any TRIM that violates Article III of 
the GATT 1994.78 Under the national treatment obligation of Article 
 
TRIMs Agreement, the FIT DCR requires the purchase of domestic goods over 
imported goods to obtain an advantage). 
 72.  See id. (arguing that under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement, 
the Italian FIT Program constitutes a prohibited subsidy that favors the use of 
domestic over imported goods). 
 73.  TRIMs Agreement art. 1. 
 74.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.109–7.110 
(noting that the Ontario FIT Program encouraged investment in the local 
production of renewable-energy-generation components and motivated 
manufacturers to build local facilities for the production of such components). 
 75.  See id. (finding that the DCR in the Ontario FIT Program constituted a 
TRIM because it favored Ontario-made components over imported ones, and WTO 
jurisprudence has found that DCRs always favor the use of domestic products over 
imported products, thereby affecting trade). 
 76.  See id. ¶ 7.110 (citing contract documents, movement of companies to 
Ontario, and prior WTO jurisprudence as evidence that the Ontario FIT DCR 
favored the use of domestic products over imported products). 
 77.  See id. ¶ 7.112 (moving to an analysis of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 after 
concluding that the Ontario DCR constituted a TRIM).  
 78.  TRIMs Agreement art. 2.1. See generally GATT 1994, art. III:4 
(describing the national treatment obligation as the mandate that foreign products 
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III:4, a solar-PV component imported from abroad must receive 
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to “like [EU solar-PV-
component] products” with respect to all available incentives.79 
To support its analysis of Article 2.1, the prospective WTO Panel 
will likely evaluate Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement to 
determine whether the Italian FIT DCR violates both the national 
treatment obligation in the GATT 1994 and the obligations within 
the TRIMs Agreement. Article 2.2 indicates that the Annex to the 
TRIMs Agreement provides an Illustrative List of TRIMs that also 
violate the national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the 
GATT 1994.80 Under Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List, the 
TRIMs must require, inter alia, that an enterprise purchase or use 
products either of domestic origin or from a domestic source.81 The 
chapeau to the Illustrative List also defines as violative of the 
national treatment obligation those TRIMs for which compliance “is 
necessary to obtain an advantage” or those TRIMs that “are 
mandatory or enforceable under domestic or administrative 
rulings.”82 
Applying the relevant provisions in the Illustrative List to the facts 
in the present dispute, the Panel would have to determine whether the 
price advantage for solar-PV generators under the Italian FIT DCR is 
contingent upon sourcing components from the European Union or 
the European Economic Area. If the DCR maintains this sourcing 
requirement, then the Panel would likely find that the FIT DCR 
provides a preferential advantage to solar-PV component producers 
that violates both the national treatment obligation of Article III:4 of 
 
be accorded “treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use”). 
 79.  See Wilke, supra note 11, at 10 (recognizing the argument that 
“governmentally imposed FIT-linked local content requirements pose an incentive 
to purchase locally produced goods to profit from the programme,” thereby 
unfairly discriminating against domestic products). 
 80.  TRIMs Agreement art. 2.2; see Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra 
note 11, ¶¶ 7.119–7.120 (stating that when a measure violates the national 
treatment obligation in Article III:4, and the measure has the traits described in 
Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List in Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement, the 
same measure will violate both Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of 
the TRIMs Agreement). 
 81.  TRIMs Agreement Annex, para. 1(a). 
 82.  Id. Annex, para. 1. 
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the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.83 Under 
the national treatment obligation, the FIT DCR would provide less 
favorable treatment to imported components than to like components 
of European origin, and under the TRIMs Agreement, the FIT DCR 
would upset the competitive relationship between European 
components and imported components.84 
In its complexity, the analysis that the Panel adopts from Canada 
– Measures goes beyond the traditional analysis undertaken in 
Article III:4 cases because it assesses violations of the national 
treatment obligation through the lens of the Illustrative List in Annex 
1 to the TRIMs Agreement.85 Normally, the Panel would need to 
determine whether domestic and imported products are “like 
products” in an analysis of Article III:4; however, as the panel 
recognized in Canada – Measures, domestic and imported products 
may be treated as “like products” where the origin of the products is 
the only differentiating factor.86 Furthermore, through its Illustrative 
 
 83.  Cf. Lee, supra note 47, at 62 (stating that Article III aims to protect the 
expectations of WTO Members in a competitive relationship between imported 
products and like products of national origin, and that incentives or advantages 
granted to like products of national origin would upset that competitive 
relationship). 
 84.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.155–7.157 
(stating that if the Ontario FIT Program’s “Minimum Required Domestic Content 
Level” requires electricity generators to use renewable energy generation 
components of Canadian origin and is necessary to obtain an advantage under the 
TRIMs Agreement, it will also violate Article III:4 of the GATT 1994). 
 85.  Compare Srikar, supra note 9, at 41 (stating that in an analysis of a 
measure’s consistency with Article III:4, WTO panels have looked to (1) whether 
the imported products affected by the measure are “like” products of national 
origin; and (2) whether the regulatory distinction between the two products results 
in less favorable treatment of imports), and Lee, supra note 47, at 63 (endorsing 
the “like products” test as the proper methodology for determining whether the 
DCR of the Ontario FIT Program violated Article III:4 of the GATT 1994), with 
Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.157 (resorting to the 
language of the Illustrative List to determine (i) whether the domestic content 
requirement applied under the FIT Program requires electricity generators using 
solar-PV and wind power technology to purchase or use renewable energy 
generation components sourced within Canada; and (ii) whether compliance with 
the domestic content requirement is necessary to obtain an “advantage”). 
 86.  Lee, supra note 47, at 64 (citing Panel Report, India - Measures Affecting 
the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001)); cf. 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Containing Asbestos, ¶ 101, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (noting that 
several panels and the Appellate Body have outlined four general criteria to 
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List in Paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement, the TRIMs 
Agreement provides a list of the types of measures that would 
provide less favorable treatment to imported products than to 
domestic products under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.87 As a 
result, panels have the discretion to determine that a separate analysis 
of the DCR under Article III:4 is unnecessary after initially 
examining Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement.88 
 
consider in tandem when analyzing the “likeness” of domestic and imported 
products: the properties, nature, and quality of the products; the end-uses of the 
products; consumers’ tastes and habits; and, the tariff classification of the 
products). 
 87.  See Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, ¶ 
7.157, WT/DS146/R (Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter India Automotive Sector Panel 
Report] (acknowledging that the TRIMs Agreement, through its Illustrative List, 
both provides additional guidance on the identification of certain measures deemed 
to be inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and introduces rights and 
obligations that are specific to it, through its notification mechanism and related 
provisions); see also Chapter 8: Trade-Related Investment Measures, JAPANESE 
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS., available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCT9908e.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2013) (noting that examples of TRIMs restrictions include local content 
requirements, manufacturing requirements, trade-balancing requirements, 
domestic-sales requirements, technology-transfer requirements, export-
performance requirements, local equity restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions, 
remittance restrictions, licensing requirements, and employment restrictions).  
 88.  See, e.g., Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 
5.93–5.95 (finding that a secondary analysis under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 
would only be necessary where the panel provided a “partial resolution of the 
matter at issue,” or that an additional finding with respect to a stand-alone Article 
III:4 claim “is necessary so as to allow for prompt compliance” or would compel 
the panel to request different types of relief); Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶ 14.93, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998) 
[hereinafter Indonesia – Automobile Industry Panel Report] (finding, pursuant to 
principles of judicial economy, that the Panel may address claims related to the 
local content requirement under the TRIMs Agreement without analyzing Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994 because (1) any local content requirement that is 
inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement would also violate the national treatment 
obligation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994; (2) the TRIMs Agreement is more 
specific than Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 with respect to violations of local 
content requirements; and (3) any action taken to remedy the inconsistencies of the 
local content requirement under the TRIMs Agreement would also remedy its 
inconsistencies with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994). But see, e.g., Panel Report, 
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, ¶¶ 10.63–10.64, 
WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000) (opting to examine under Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994 a measure mandating that automobiles manufactured in 
Canada contain certain levels of Canadian value added after finding that the 
TRIMs Agreement is not more specific than Article III:4 regarding the claims of 
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Prior to addressing whether the DCR violates Article 2.1 of the 
TRIMs Agreement, the Panel must first address the exception 
provided in Article III:8(a) of GATT 1994.89 If the DCR meets that 
exception, the WTO will likely excuse violations of Article III of the 
GATT 1994, and by extension, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs 
Agreement.90 
2. Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 
According to Article III:8(a), the provisions of Article III of the 
GATT 1994 do not apply to “laws, regulations or requirements 
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products 
purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods 
for commercial sale.”91 In Canada – Measures, the panel engaged in 
a three-step analysis of Article III:8(a) to determine whether a DCR 
in the Ontario FIT Program constituted government procurement, 
and it held that the program did not fall within the government-
procurement exception.92 
For the prospective WTO Panel to undertake the same analysis, it 
 
discrimination asserted by complainants); India Automotive Sector Panel Report, 
supra note 87, ¶ 7.157 (choosing to apply Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 to the 
Indian trade-related investment measures after finding that the TRIMs Agreement 
was not necessarily more specific than Article III:4, as it may simply provide 
additional guidance as to which measures are inconsistent with Article III:4). 
 89.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.114, 7.118 
(noting that government procurement transactions covered by the terms of Article 
III:8(a) will be consistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement because 
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement refers to the “provisions of Article III,” which 
include Article III:8(a)). 
 90.  See id. ¶ 7.118 (clarifying that any government procurement transactions 
covered by the terms of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 will be excepted from 
the obligations set forth both in Article III, which includes Article III:4, and Article 
2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement). 
 91.  GATT 1994 art. III:8(a); cf. Wilke, supra note 11, at 12 (opining that 
governments may discriminate against WTO Members notwithstanding the TRIMs 
Agreement and Article III of GATT 1994 if FITs constitute “government 
procurement”).  
 92.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.122–7.124, 
7.129, 7.146–7.147 (asking whether (1) the DCR may be characterized as a 
measure governing procurement; (2) the challenged measure involved procurement 
by governmental agencies; and (3) the governmental agencies undertook the 
procurement for governmental purposes and not for commercial resale). 
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must first specify which products will be subject to government 
procurement and the nature of the market relationship between those 
products. In a case where the Panel compares two sets of products—
namely solar-PV generation equipment and electricity—those 
products must have a competitive relationship in the relevant 
market.93 Here, the solar-PV generation equipment is the product of 
foreign origin against which Italy has discriminated in its DCR, and 
electricity is the product that the Italian Government will attempt to 
procure.94 Absent a competitive relationship between these two 
products, the discrimination against generation equipment contained 
in the FIT Program would not fall within the scope of Article III:8(a) 
of the GATT 1994.95 In such a case, the Panel would return to an 
analysis of Article 2.1, Article 2.2, and Paragraph 1(a) of the Annex 
to the TRIMs Agreement.96 
3. Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement 
In its complaint before the WTO, China also has alleged that the 
Italian FIT Program violates Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM 
Agreement as a prohibited subsidy.97 Before China may resort to 
Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2, however, it must first establish the existence 
of a subsidy.98 Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement provides that 
 
 93.  See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 5.76, 
5.79 (emphasizing that the relationship between the product of foreign origin that 
is the target of discrimination (renewable energy generation equipment) and the 
product purchased by the Ontario Government (electricity) must be competitive, 
not merely close as the Panel Report suggested). 
 94.  See id. ¶¶ 5.79–5.84 (noting the difference between the product subject to 
the Ontario DCR—the renewable energy generation equipment—and the product 
procured by the Ontario government—electricity). 
 95.  See id. ¶¶ 5.78–5.84 (reversing the panel’s findings that a DCR is a law, 
regulation, or requirement governing the procurement by governmental agencies of 
electricity under Article III:8(a) because the product of foreign origin that is the 
subject of discrimination and the product purchased must have a competitive 
relationship). 
 96.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.155 (moving to 
an analysis of the compatibility of the “Minimum Required Domestic Content 
Level” with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 subject to the obligations in Articles 
2.1 and 2.2 and the Illustrative List in the TRIMs Agreement after finding that the 
DCR failed to meet the criteria in Article III:8(a)). 
 97.  See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that the FIT Program 
satisfies the definition of a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement 
because it is contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods). 
 98.  See id. (claiming that the FIT measures that violate Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 
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a subsidy exists where a government or public body makes a 
financial contribution within the territory of a Member State such 
that, inter alia, the government purchases goods.99 Additionally, 
pursuant to Article 1.1(b), the financial contribution must also confer 
a “benefit” upon the recipient.100 A “benefit” exists in the context of 
Article 1.1(b) when it provides an advantage to its recipient; the 
existence of any quantifiable advantage is determined by “comparing 
the position of the recipient in the marketplace with and without the 
financial contribution.”101 To provide context for Article 1.1(b),102 the 
Panel likely would look to Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement, 
which provides that measures governing the purchase of goods do 
not constitute a “benefit” unless the purchase of the goods is made 
for more than adequate remuneration.103 Indeed, previous WTO 
panels have determined that a financial contribution will confer a 
“benefit” only where the government provides it on more favorable 
terms than those available to the recipient in the market.104 
 
of the SCM Agreement are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1). See 
generally SCM Agreement art. 1.1 (outlining the conditions in which a financial 
contribution constitutes a subsidy and confers a benefit). 
 99.  SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (stating that a subsidy is deemed to exist 
where the government, either in its own capacity or through another agency, 
purchases goods). 
 100.  Id. art. 1.1(b). 
 101.  See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.148.  
 102.  See id. ¶¶ 5.163, 5.165 (concurring with the panel’s choice to read Article 
14(d) for useful context for the interpretation of “benefit” under Article 1.1(b), 
even though Article 14(d) is in Part V of the SCM Agreement). 
 103.  SCM Agreement art. 14(d) (stating that the governmental purchase of 
goods does not confer a “benefit” unless the purchase is made for more than 
adequate remuneration, determined in light of marketability, prevailing market 
conditions for the good in the country, and price conditions); see also Canada – 
Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.271–7.272 (explaining the legal 
significance of Article 14(d)).  
 104.  E.g., Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft, ¶ 9.112, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Canada – Civilian 
Aircraft Panel Report] (reasoning that a financial contribution confers a “benefit” 
only if provided on terms more advantageous than otherwise available in the open 
market); Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft – Second Complaint, ¶ 7.475, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011) (finding it 
“well-established” that to confer a “benefit” within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) 
of the SCM agreement, the terms of the financial contribution must be more 
favorable than those otherwise generally available). 
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4. Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement 
Provided that China can prove the existence of a subsidy, the 
WTO Panel would then turn to an analysis of Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2. 
Under Article 3.1(b), subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic 
over imported goods are strictly prohibited.105 Article 3.2 simply 
reiterates this rule as a cornerstone of the SCM Agreement.106 Under 
the force of these two articles, the SCM Agreement regulates 
subsidies to ensure that they do not create adverse effects in the 
markets of WTO Member States.107 Indeed, previous panels have 
stated that the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement is to curtail 
specifically those subsidies that are designed to distort international 
trade.108 Therefore, an FIT would likely constitute a subsidy program 
under Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) if it provides for the sale of solar-
based electricity terms that are more favorable than those present in 
the market.109 To determine whether the terms granted in the FIT 
Program are more favorable, the Panel must find an appropriate 
benchmark within the market with which to compare the FIT 
Program.110 
 
 105.  See SCM Agreement art. 3.1(b). 
 106.  Id. art. 3.2 (stating that no Member shall grant or maintain prohibited 
subsidies). 
 107.  Id. arts. 5–6; see also Wilke, supra note 11, at 9 (indicating that adverse 
effects exist for purposes of Article 5 of the SCM Agreement in the following 
scenarios: (i) injury to the domestic industry of a WTO Member State; (ii) 
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other 
members; or (iii) serious prejudice to the interests of another member). 
 108.  E.g., Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints 
as Subsidies, ¶ 8.63, WT/DS194/R (June 29, 2001); Panel Report, Brazil – Export 
Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 7.26, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Canada – 
Civilian Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶ 9.119. 
 109.  See Vidhi R. Shah, Comment, The Allocation of Free Emissions 
Allowances by Germany to Its Steel Industry: A Possible Subsidy Claim Under the 
W.T.O. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 445, 463–64 (2007) (noting that when a financial contribution provides a 
“benefit,” it distorts trade, and a panel will identify this distortion by determining 
whether the industry received the financial contribution on terms more favorable 
than those available to the recipient in the market). 
 110.  Id. at 465 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the 
Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 149–61, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999)) (restating 
the Appellate Body’s view that “the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for 
comparison in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred’”). 
  
696 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:3 
III. ANALYSIS 
If a WTO panel is established, it would likely find that the Italian 
FIT DCR violates the TRIMs Agreement because it requires that 
owners of solar-PV generators purchase or use components from the 
European Union or the European Economic Area to become eligible 
for an advantage that is otherwise unavailable to them.111 Italy likely 
will claim that its FIT DCR qualifies as government procurement 
under Article III:8(a), but because the product procured (solar-based 
electricity) does not maintain a competitive relationship with the 
products subject to discrimination (solar-PV generation equipment), 
Article III:8(a) likely will not exempt the Italian FIT DCR from 
scrutiny under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the 
TRIMs Agreement.112 Even though the Panel might find that the FIT 
DCR violates the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement and the GATT 
1994, the Italian FIT Program may not violate the SCM Agreement 
because it does not necessarily confer a “benefit” upon solar-PV 
generators.113 
A. TRIMS AGREEMENT AND GATT 1994 
1. The DCR Within the Italian FIT Program Constitutes a TRIM 
Under Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement 
As stated previously, the WTO defines a TRIM as an investment 
measure related to trade in goods only.114 When analyzing the DCR 
most analogous to that in the Italian FIT Program, the panel in 
Canada – Measures found that the Ontario FIT Program affected 
trade in the local production of renewable-energy-generation 
components by overtly favoring Ontario products over imported 
 
 111.  See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining that the DCR within the FIT 
Program constitutes a regulation that solar-PV generation companies that purchase 
components manufactured in either the European Union or the European Economic 
Area will receive an increase in the sale price of electricity and, because this 
regulation does not extend to like imports, it provides an advantage to European-
based components). 
 112.  See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 113.  See id. (postulating that, under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the 
Italian FIT Program may not confer a “benefit” upon solar-PV generators because 
tariff degression and other measures will bring solar-PV generators to grid-parity 
in the near future). 
 114.  TRIMs Agreement art. 1. 
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ones.115 To this extent, several companies either built or planned to 
build manufacturing plants in Ontario to take advantage of its FIT 
Program.116 
Much like the Ontario FIT Program, the Italian FIT Program 
encourages significant investment in the local production of solar-PV 
generator components.117 At least some manufacturers in Italy have 
renewed their focus on the production of renewable energy 
technologies,118 and some have built generators, either in Italy or 
other EU Member States, to take advantage of the price increase 
available to manufacturers that source components domestically.119 
Because the Italian FIT DCR encourages investment in the local 
production of solar-PV components, it is also a TRIM under Article 
1 of the TRIMs Agreement.120 
 
 115.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.111 (recalling the 
Panel’s earlier decision in Indonesia – Automobile Industry, where it held that 
DCRs, by design and definition, always favor domestic products over imported 
products, which impacts trade); cf. Lee, supra note 47, at 59 (stating that the OPA 
included the DCR so that Ontario manufacturers would be able to participate in the 
economic benefits flowing from the program).  
 116.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.110 (noting that 
Siemens has become a local manufacturer in Ontario and that ENERCON will 
build a manufacturing plant in Ontario). 
 117.  See Solar Power, supra note 26 (announcing a venture between Enel 
Green Power, Sharp, and STMicroelectronics that includes the manufacture of 
solar-PV panels at the largest PV production plant at a national level, one of the 
largest of its kind in Europe); cf. Indonesia – Automobile Industry Panel Report, 
supra note 88, ¶ 6.4 (finding that Indonesian car programs constitute investment 
measures because they have plainly stated investment objectives aimed at 
encouraging the development of local manufacturing capability for completed 
motor vehicles, car parts, and car components in Indonesia, and have had a 
significant impact on investment in the automobile manufacturing sector). 
 118.  See Solar Power, supra note 26 (reporting that Enel Green Power and 
Sharp Solar Energy have agreed to develop, build, and manage solar-PV plants in 
Europe using the panels manufactured in Catania, Italy). 
 119.  See, e.g., SunPower Builds Italy’s Largest Solar Power Plant in Montalto 
di Castro, SUNPOWER, http://us.sunpowercorp.com/power-plant/success-
stories/development-approach/?relType=SP_Content_C&relID=1293430111928 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (announcing that SunRay constructed the largest solar-
PV plant in Italy to date); First Solar ‘Made in EU’ Stamp Comes with Discount, 
CNET (Sept. 1, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-20100430-54/first-
solar-made-in-eu-stamp-comes-with-discount/ (reporting that First Solar has 
received the right to use “Made in EU” or “Made in Europe” on its thin-film solar 
panels made in Germany). 
 120.  See Indonesia – Automobile Industry Panel Report, supra note 88, ¶¶ 
14.82–14.83 (stating that the local content requirements affect trade because local 
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Before proceeding to an analysis of Articles 2.1 and 2.2, however, 
the Panel will need to determine whether the DCR qualifies for the 
government-procurement exception under Article III:8(a) of the 
GATT 1994.121 
2. The DCR in the Italian FIT Program Does Not Qualify for the 
Exception in Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 
For the Italian FIT DCR to qualify for the exception in Article 
III:8(a), the Panel would have to find that the product of foreign 
origin against which the DCR discriminates (solar-PV generation 
equipment) maintains a competitive market relationship with the 
product procured by the Italian Government (solar-based 
electricity).122 Without this competitive relationship, the DCR will 
not fall within the scope of Article III:8(a), and it likely will violate 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs 
Agreement.123 
Like the generation equipment against which the Ontario DCR 
discriminated, the generation equipment against which the Italian 
DCR discriminates does not maintain a competitive relationship with 
the electricity procured by the Italian Government. In Canada – 
Measures, the panel found that the Ontario DCR was a “necessary 
condition and prerequisite” governing the procurement of electricity 
because the Ontario Government purchased the electricity, produced 
by renewable energy generators under the FIT Program, only if sixty 
percent of the components used in the generators were sourced from 
 
content requirements, by definition, always affect trade and favor the use of 
domestic products over imported products).  
 121.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.122 (undertaking 
an analysis of Article III:8(a) of GATT 1994 before reaching Articles 2.1 and 2.2 
and Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement). 
 122.  See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.79 
(“We have found above that the conditions for derogation under Article III:8(a) 
must be understood in relation to the obligation stipulated in the other paragraphs 
of Article III. This means that the product of foreign origin allegedly being 
discriminated against must be in a competitive relationship with the product 
purchased.”). 
 123.  See id. (overturning panel findings that the Ontario DCR constitutes a law, 
regulation, or requirement governing the procurement by governmental agencies of 
electricity under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 because the generation 
equipment receiving discrimination did not have a competitive relationship with 
the electricity procured by the Ontario Government). 
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Ontario.124 The generation equipment was “needed and used” to 
produce the electricity, and consequently, the generation equipment 
subject to the DCR and the electricity procured by the Ontario 
Government had a close relationship, which the panel deemed 
necessary for the DCR to be considered a requirement that governed 
the procurement of electricity.125 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body overturned the panel’s finding 
and held that the Ontario FIT DCR did not constitute a law, 
regulation, or requirement “governing the procurement by 
governmental agencies’ of electricity within the meaning of Article 
III:8(a)” because the discrimination relating to generation equipment 
contained in the FIT Program was not covered under Article 
III:8(a).126 The Appellate Body stressed that the Ontario FIT DCR 
discriminated against the generation equipment used to produce the 
electricity, not the electricity itself, which was the target of the 
Ontario Government’s procurement.127 Given this distinction, the 
generation equipment against which the Ontario FIT DCR 
discriminated was required to have a competitive relationship—not 
simply a close relationship—with the electricity procured by the 
Ontario Government.128 In Canada – Measures, the generation 
equipment subject to discrimination by the Ontario DCR did not 
have a competitive relationship with the electricity procured by the 
Ontario Government within the local market because the generation 
equipment and the electricity did not compete in the same market.129 
With no competitive relationship between the electricity and the 
generation equipment, the Ontario FIT DCR failed to qualify for the 
exception under Article III:8(a). 
Unlike the Ontario DCR, the Italian DCR does not require that 
solar-PV generators use domestically-sourced renewable-energy-
 
 124.  Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165. 
 125.  See id. ¶ 7.127 (stating that there is a close relationship between the 
products that are affected by the relevant “laws, regulations or requirements”—
renewable energy generation equipment—and the product that is allegedly 
procured—electricity). 
 126.  Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.79. 
 127.  Id. (“In the case before us, the product being procured is electricity, 
whereas the product discriminated against for reason of its origin is generation 
equipment.”). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
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generation equipment to be involved in the FIT Program.130 Instead, 
the Italian DCR requires simply that solar-PV generators use 
domestically-sourced equipment (from either the European Union or 
the European Economic Area) to qualify for an increase in the sale 
price of electricity that they produce.131 Because the DCR is not a 
prerequisite for compliance with the FIT Program, the generation 
equipment that it targets certainly does not compete with the 
electricity procured, let alone hold a close relationship with that 
electricity. As a result, the Panel is even less likely to identify the 
Italian FIT DCR as a law, regulation, or requirement governing the 
procurement by governmental agencies of electricity within the 
meaning of Article III:8(a). The DCR will likely fail to meet the first 
prong of the analysis under Article III:8(a), and as a result, the Panel 
will likely continue with its analysis of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the 
TRIMs Agreement. 
3. The DCR in the Italian FIT Program Is Inconsistent with Article 
2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement 
If the Italian FIT DCR shares the traits elaborated in Paragraph 
1(a) of the Illustrative List and the chapeau to the Paragraph, it also 
will be inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and 
the national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994. The Panel would have to determine whether the DCR requires 
the purchase or use of products from a domestic source and whether 
compliance with the DCR is necessary to obtain an advantage.132 
First, the Panel would likely find that the Italian FIT DCR requires 
the purchase or use of products from a domestic source.133 In Canada 
 
 130.  Compare Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.158, 7.163 
(stating that the solar-PV and wind-power generators must be comprised of a 
certain percentage of components sourced within Ontario to participate in the 
Ontario FIT Program), with D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d), and D.M. n. 
143/2012, art. 4(5)(d) (establishing favorable purchase prices for solar-PV units 
with a certain percentage of parts sourced from within the European Union or the 
Eurepean Economic Area). 
 131.  E.g., D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d); D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 4(5)(d). 
 132.  Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.157. 
 133.  See id. ¶ 7.163 (finding that the Ontario FIT DCR required the purchase or 
use of products sourced from Ontario to guarantee that electricity generated by 
solar-PV and wind plants would be purchased at the price guaranteed in the 
Ontario FIT Program). 
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– Measures, the panel determined that solar-PV generators must 
source sixty percent of their components from Ontario to satisfy the 
DCR within the Ontario FIT Program.134 Because the Ontario FIT 
Program mandated that renewable energy generators purchase or use 
a certain percentage of renewable-energy-generation components 
sourced from Ontario, the Ontario FIT Program required the use of 
components from a domestic source as described in Paragraph 1(a) 
of the Illustrative List.135 
Like the Ontario FIT DCR, the Italian FIT DCR requires the 
purchase or use of products from a domestic source, namely Italy or 
another EU/EEA Member State.136 The Fourth Energy Bill mandates 
that solar-PV generators meet a sixty-percent threshold of EU/EEA-
sourced components to earn a ten-percent increase in the sale price of 
electricity,137 while the Fifth Energy Bill requires that the modules or 
inverters within the generators be manufactured within the European 
Union or European Economic Area to earn the price increase.138 
Because the Fourth and Fifth Energy Bills both require the use of 
components from domestic sources, the Italian FIT DCR satisfies the 
first element of Paragraph 1(a) of the TRIMs Agreement. 
Next, the Panel likely would find that compliance with the DCR in 
the Italian FIT Program is necessary to obtain an advantage.139 In 
Canada – Measures, the panel found that compliance with the 
Ontario FIT DCR guaranteed that solar-PV and wind-power 
 
 134.  See id. ¶ 7.158 (listing the content requirements for solar-PV FIT 
generators and solar-PV microFIT generators). 
 135.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.164–7.165 
(finding that because the generators must use at least some components from 
Ontario to be eligible for the FIT Program, the DCR requires use of components 
from a domestic source). See generally TRIMs Agreement Annex, para. 1(a) 
(stating that TRIMs are inconsistent with the national treatment obligation in 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 if they require purchase or use by an enterprise of 
products of a domestic origin or source). 
 136.  See, e.g., D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d); D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 4(5)(d). 
 137.  D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d). 
 138.  D.M. n. 143/2012, arts. 2(1)(v), 4(5)(d), 5(2)(a). 
 139.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165 (finding that 
compliance with the DCR was necessary to qualify for the guaranteed FIT rate in 
the Ontario FIT Program). See generally TRIMs Agreement Annex, para. 1(a) 
(stating that TRIMs are also inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment 
in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 if compliance with the TRIM is necessary to 
obtain an advantage). 
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generators would receive a fixed price for any electricity they 
produced.140 In turn, the sale of electricity at the guaranteed price 
generated a healthy return on investment in generators using 
components sourced from Ontario.141 Moreover, failure to comply 
with the terms of the Ontario FIT DCR placed FIT generators in 
default of their contractual obligations.142 Because compliance with 
the DCR guaranteed participation in the Ontario FIT Program, it 
provided an advantage as stated in Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative 
List. 
The Italian FIT DCR likely provides solar-PV generators with an 
advantage because it grants a price increase to those generators that 
use domestically-sourced components over components sourced 
from abroad.143 This price increase constitutes a preferential 
advantage because generators that fail to meet the DCR threshold 
will not be able to sell their solar-PV-based electricity at comparable 
prices.144 As a result, the DCR impedes the sale of like solar-PV 
components from non-EU Member States in the Italian market and 
disrupts their competitive relationship in the solar-PV-component 
market.145 The DCR meets the requirements set forth in Paragraph 
 
 140.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165 (finding that 
compliance with the DCR was a precondition for electricity generators to 
participate in the FIT Program). 
 141.  Id.; see Lee, supra note 47, at 59 (explaining that the FIT rates were 
designed to cover the capital and operating costs of a project while providing a 
reasonable rate of return on a project developer’s investment over the twenty-year 
term). 
 142.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165 (stating that 
if a failure to comply with a contractual obligation nullifies the contract, the 
fulfillment of that obligation is a necessary condition to receive the benefit). 
 143.  See Lee, supra note 47, at 67 (“The Panel in Canada – Autos found that 
such a measure, which provides that an advantage can be obtained by using 
domestic products but not by using imported products, had an ‘impact on the 
conditions of competition between imported and domestic products,’ thus the 
measure ‘affected’ the sale of the imported products.”). 
 144.  See, e.g., D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d); D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 4(5)(d) 
(increasing the sale price of electricity in the Italian market so long as a certain 
percentage of components used in solar-PV generators are EU/EEA sourced). 
 145.  Cf. Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural 
Machinery, ¶¶ 5, 22, 25, L/833 – 7S/60 (July 15, 1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th 
Supp.) at 2, 5–6 (1958) (providing that a measure granting more favorable terms 
and credit facilities to purchases of Italian goods than to purchases of non-Italian 
goods influenced purchasers to buy Italian goods, which resulted in a violation of 
Article III:4 of GATT 1994). 
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1(a) of the Illustrative List and the chapeau to the Paragraph, and as a 
result, violates both Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and the 
national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
B. SCM AGREEMENT 
Despite the finding that the FIT Program constitutes a financial 
contribution to Italian solar-PV generators, the Panel may not find 
that the Italian FIT Program constitutes a subsidy under Article 1.1 
of the SCM Agreement. With its public utilities, the Italian 
Government provides a financial contribution to solar-PV generators 
by procuring the electricity that the generators produce,146 an 
arrangement that constitutes the purchase of a good under Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii).147 Nevertheless, the Italian FIT Program may not 
confer a “benefit” upon the recipients of the financial contribution in 
the context of Article 1.1(b),148 despite generous tariffs and high 
levels of insolation, which have allowed the solar-PV sector to grow 
significantly.149 As this comment demonstrates, tariff degression 
continues to pare down the costs of the FIT significantly, and the 
Italian government is downsizing its FIT Program now that it nearly 
has reached grid-parity with fossil-fuel resources.150 
1. The Italian FIT Program Satisfies Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM 
Agreement 
In order for the Panel to find that the Italian FIT Program 
constitutes a prohibited subsidy, it must first determine whether, 
under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement, the FIT Program 
 
 146.  See Simone Monesi, Italy, in THE ENERGY REGULATION AND MARKETS 
REVIEW 146, 149 (David L. Schwartz ed., 2012) (identifying ENEL, Terna SpA, 
ENEL Distribuzione, and GME—all publicly-owned Italian companies—as the 
parties responsible for generating electricity, dispatching it to transmission grids, 
operating grids, selling electricity, and managing trades in the market, 
respectively). 
 147.  See generally SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (providing that a subsidy 
exists if a government or public body provides a financial contribution, inter alia, 
by purchasing goods). 
 148.  See id. art. 1.1(b). 
 149.  See Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (emphasizing that Italian 
tariffs remain fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs with Italy’s 
high levels of sunshine). 
 150.  See Fulton et al., supra note 44 (identifying grid-parity as a realizable goal 
given the gradual and transparent nature of degression). 
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provides a financial contribution to solar-PV generators via the 
Italian public utility, GSE, which purchases solar-based electricity.151 
A government or public body provides a financial contribution when, 
inter alia, it purchases and obtains possession of goods.152 
In both the Ontario and Italian FIT Programs, procurement of 
electricity fits the definition of a purchase of a good by a 
governmental agent. The Panel in Canada – Measures found that 
Hydro One, the publicly-owned electricity retailer, ably met the 
description of a governmental agent, as the Government of Ontario 
had imposed a duty on Hydro One both to operate generation 
facilities and distribution systems and to dispatch electricity to 
communities within Ontario.153 As the OPA supplied electricity into 
the grid,154 Hydro One transmitted and distributed that electricity to 
retail customers under the direction of the FIT Program.155 For these 
 
 151.  See Statuto del “Gestore dei Servizi Energetici – GSE S.p.A.” (adopted 
pursuant to Decreto Legislativo 16 marzo 1999, n. 79 (It.)), available at 
http://www.gse.it/it/Azienda/GSE_Documenti/Azienda/Missione/Documenti/Mode
llo%20organizzativo/Statuto_GSE2010.pdf (identifying the roles and 
responsibilities of GSE in the Italian FIT Program); see also RainChief Energy 
Business Summary, RAINCHIEF RENEWABLE ENERGY 1 (Dec. 2010), 
http://stocksjournal.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/RCFEF.pdf 
[hereinafter RainChief Energy Business Summary] (stating that GSE, as the Italian 
Government’s national power authority, establishes FIT rates and pays the rates on 
the basis of kW hours of electricity power delivered into the grid). 
 152.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.233 (citing 
Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
¶¶ 317–18, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter US – AD/CVD (China)] 
(stating that where a statute or other legal instrument fails to vest authority in the 
entity concerned, that entity constitutes a “public body” if it is vested with 
governmental authority and exercises governmental functions). See generally SCM 
Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (stating that a financial contribution is deemed to exist 
when a government purchases goods). 
 153.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.234–7.235 
(finding that the Government of Ontario had meaningful control over Hydro One, 
as the utility (1) was established by the government; (2) remained accountable to 
the government; (3) had its delegates appointed by the government; (4) has had 
authority assigned to it; and (5) had several arrangements as a Crown Corporation 
of the Government of Ontario). 
 154.  See id. ¶ 7.239 (highlighting that the OPA paid the FIT rates while Hydro 
One controlled the flow of electricity through the grid). 
 155.  See id. (noting that Hydro One owns and operates ninety-seven percent of 
the transmission lines and distributes electricity to 1.3 million customers, 
suggesting that the Government of Ontario purchases the electricity delivered into 
the grid under the FIT Program). 
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reasons, the Panel found that, through its FIT Program, the 
Government of Ontario purchased electricity as required for a 
subsidy under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement. 
In the present case, all of the Italian utilities at issue—the utility 
company (GSE), the electricity retailer (Enel Green Power), and the 
Italian grid operator (Terna Rete Italia)—are publicly-owned 
entities.156 Like the OPA, GSE purchases electricity from renewable-
energy-generation plants and trades that electricity on the market.157 
Moreover, in the same way that Hydro One distributed electricity in 
the interest of the Ontario Government, Enel and Terna operate 
generation facilities and distribute electricity, respectively, in the 
interest of the Italian Government.158 As a result, the Panel likely will 
find that the Italian Government, through its FIT Program, purchases 
electricity as required for a subsidy under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the 
SCM Agreement. 
2. The Italian FIT Program Does Not Satisfy Article 1.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement 
After determining that the Italian FIT Program constitutes a 
financial contribution in which the government purchases goods, the 
Panel may not find that the purchase guarantee in the Italian FIT 
Program confers a “benefit” to solar-PV generators under Article 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. In its analysis of Article 1.1(b), the 
Panel would likely resort to Article 14(d), which states that a 
government’s purchase of goods shall not confer a “benefit” unless 
made for more than adequate remuneration.159 
 
 156.  See About Us, ENEL, supra note 25 (stating that the Italian Ministry of 
Economy and Finance holds 31.24% of Enel’s shares); see also About Terna Rete 
Italia, supra note 30; GSE S.p.A, supra note 27 (providing that the sole owner of 
GSE is the Ministry of Economy and Finance (“MEF”) and that the MEF exercises 
its shareholder rights jointly with the Ministry of Economic Development). But see 
US – AD/CVD (China), supra note 152, ¶¶ 317–18 (ruling that, absent additional 
indicia that an entity is controlled by the government, the fact that a government is 
the majority shareholder of an entity does not allow for an inference that the entity 
is exercising governmental authority, and therefore, is a public body). 
 157.  RainChief Energy Business Summary, supra note 151, at 1. 
 158.  See Nela Lazarevic, The Big Three: Terna, CGES and Enel, BALKAN 
INSIGHT (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/terna-cges-enel 
(providing that the Italian Government controls Terna through its major 
shareholder, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti). 
 159.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.271–7.278 
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Notably, while the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding in 
Canada – Measures that the Ontario FIT Program did not confer a 
“benefit” under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, it was unable 
to complete the panel’s analysis and make its own affirmative 
determination as to whether the Ontario FIT Program conferred a 
“benefit” upon renewable energy generation companies.160 This issue 
is a particularly close one and likely will be revisited in future FIT 
disputes. Therefore, this comment will explore Italy’s and China’s 
prospective arguments in more detail and will review the likely 
impact of the Canada – Measures decision on the Panel’s 
deliberations in the case at bar. 
Initially, Italy may argue that its FIT Program does not confer a 
“benefit” upon solar-PV generation companies because the Italian 
wholesale electricity market fails to secure the reliable, long-term 
supply of solar-PV-generated electricity necessary for the 
functioning of any economy. In what the panel in Canada – 
Measures referred to as the “missing money problem,” private 
investors in Ontario refused to finance construction of new 
renewable energy generators when the price of electricity was low; 
as a result, the wholesale electricity market in Ontario failed to create 
the level of competition that would have attracted diverse types of 
energy and allowed the market to meet future demand.161 In failing to 
meet future demand, the Ontario Government also failed to meet the 
consumption needs of its citizens, due not only to the generation 
capacity lost from aging nuclear power plants,162 but also to record-
high summer temperatures that had exhausted Ontario’s supply of 
 
(stating that the Panel will likely measure such remuneration according to 
wholesale market conditions). See generally SCM Agreement art. 14(d) 
(establishing that adequate remuneration includes the market conditions for the 
sale of the good, marketability, transportation, and market demand). 
 160.  In the case at bar, publicly available data from out-of-country solar-PV 
generation markets is scarce, which makes it difficult to establish a comparative 
market benchmark. See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 
11, ¶¶ 5.220, 5.224–5.228, 5.246 (finding that the Appellate Body could not 
complete its legal analysis with respect to benefit benchmark comparisons between 
the appropriate wind-generated electricity prices because the panel record did not 
contain sufficient factual findings and uncontested evidence). 
 161.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.279, 7.283, 
7.308 (noting that the “missing money problem” affects electricity produced from 
all types of sources, not just renewable energy sources). 
 162.  See id. ¶¶ 7.280, 7.286. 
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electricity.163 In light of this recurring problem, the panel in Canada 
– Measures stated that sovereign governments must be allowed to 
provide incentives to secure a sustainable energy supply in new 
electricity generation.164 
Like the Ontario wholesale electricity market, the Italian 
wholesale electricity market has failed to incentivize the mix of 
energy sources needed (1) to create a reliable electricity system, (2) 
to cover generation costs, and (3) to pursue human health and 
environmental objectives.165 Italy demonstrates a significant need to 
diversify its energy sources given both the size of its market and its 
decision to phase out the use of nuclear power in the production of 
electricity.166 As Ontario suffered an energy shortage in its reliance 
upon outdated coal-powered plants,167 Italy must develop alternate 
energy resources to replace its nuclear power plants.168 
Despite Italy’s pursuit of laudable policy objectives, the 
prospective Panel likely would proceed with its analysis of whether 
the Italian FIT Program confers a “benefit” upon solar-PV 
generators. Though the Italian Government would be justified in 
following its human health and environmental policy objectives in its 
production of electricity, the Appellate Body in Canada – Measures 
 
 163.  See id. ¶¶ 7.287–7.288. 
 164.  See id. ¶ 7.283 (recommending alternative mechanisms to wholesale spot 
markets, such as power purchase agreements and capacity payments). 
 165.  Cf. id. ¶ 7.280 (noting that a diverse mix of generation technology is 
necessary to secure a reliable, clean electricity system and to serve technical, 
economic, and environmental objectives); Fulton et al., supra note 44, at 2 (stating 
that well-constructed FIT policies should incentivize renewable technologies to 
reach the grid-parity target). 
 166.  See Morris, supra note 18 (reporting that Italy is one of the largest national 
economies to have rejected the use of nuclear power in the production of 
electricity, demonstrating the great need to secure a diversified, reliable supply of 
electricity). 
 167.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.65, 7.216, 7.223 
(finding that the anticipated closure of coal-fired plants made Ontario increase 
supply of electricity produced from renewable sources to diversify its supply-mix 
and help replace the coal-fired facilities).  
 168.  See Morris, supra note 18 (referencing a referendum where over fifty 
percent of eligible Italian voters opposed construction of new nuclear power plants, 
plans to privatize water supplies, and provision of amnesty to politicians such as 
Berlusconi); see also Photovoltaic Barometer, supra note 15, at 59–61 (opining 
that the country must develop its renewable energy resources now that Italians 
have agreed to prevent new nuclear power plant reactors in a national referendum). 
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held that such objectives ought not to preclude a market-based 
analysis in the determination of “benefit.”169 Indeed, the Appellate 
Body in Canada – Measures noted that such an interpretation would 
“read an exception into Article 1.1(b) based on the rationale of the 
subsidy that has no textual basis in the [SCM] Agreement.”170 Article 
14(d) of the SCM Agreement states that a purchase of goods confers 
a “benefit” if “the purchase is made for more than adequate 
remuneration,” which would be analyzed according to “prevailing 
market conditions.”171 The latter language suggests that the 
determination of a “benefit” under Article 1.1(b) requires a 
competitive market benchmark, for which the Panel may resort to a 
second-country benchmark so long as it makes adjustments to 
replicate competitive market conditions.172 Ideally, the proper 
benchmark would comprise the Italian Government’s definition of 
the energy supply mix, which would include solar-PV-generated 
electricity, as well as a comparison of renewable-energy market 
conditions in Italy and third-market countries.173 
Given the stated need for a comparative market benchmark, China 
might argue that the Italian solar-PV energy market, when compared 
to surrounding markets, receives more than adequate remuneration 
from its government for purchases of electricity. Indeed, the high 
levels of insolation and the above-average base tariff rates in Italy 
seem to indicate that the Italian solar-PV market receives more than 
adequate remuneration for the electricity it produces.174 A FIT 
 
 169.  See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 5.182, 
5.185–5.186 (noting that the panel’s definition of “the relevant market for a benefit 
comparison as a single market for electricity generated from all sources of energy” 
as a result of policy choices should not “prevent a market-based approach to the 
determination of benefit” even though governments may reasonably intervene to 
pursue policy goals and to ensure that there is “a continuous supply-demand 
balance between generators and consumers”). 
 170.  Id. ¶ 5.182. 
 171.  SCM Agreement art. 14(d). 
 172.  See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.184 
(referencing the Appellate Body’s determination in US – Softwood Lumber IV that 
investigating authorities may use the price of the same or similar goods in a market 
outside of the country—taking into account prevailing market conditions in the 
country of provision with price, quality, and other indicators—where private prices 
for particular government-provided goods are distorted because of the 
government’s role in providing the goods). 
 173.  Id. ¶ 5.204. 
 174.  See Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (emphasizing that, as of 2011, 
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structure arguably allows Italy to harness its insolation, and 
consequently, the FIT would confer even more of a “benefit” for the 
Italian solar-PV market than the Ontario FIT does for the Ontario 
solar-PV market. Moreover, the Italian FIT covers costs of capital 
and provides solar-PV generators with reasonable rates of return for 
any electricity produced, creating a nearly risk-free environment for 
solar-PV generators.175 
Nevertheless, China’s argument concerning the high levels of 
insolation and the above-market-value prices of electricity produced 
by Italian solar-PV generators, by itself, may not convince the Panel 
that the FIT provides a “benefit” to solar-PV generators if the Panel 
takes into account the consistent downsizing of the Italian FIT 
Program. Like the FIT rates in Ontario, the Italian FIT rates are 
higher than average, though Italy has taken significant steps to 
reduce its FITs such that the Italian Government is purchasing solar-
PV-based electricity at a tariff rate that increasingly approaches 
market-level remuneration.176 In 2011, Italy’s Ministry of Industry 
passed proposals that allowed the Italian Government to reduce FIT 
rates by an average of eighteen percent.177 As solar-PV generation in 
Italy grows rapidly and generation costs decline, the Italian 
Government is increasingly adjusting regulation to moderate cost 
inefficiencies and to account for oversupplies in electricity.178 The 
oversupply of solar-PV-generated electricity has caused prices to fall 
significantly in the Italian wholesale electricity market, resulting in 
 
the tariffs remain fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs when 
adjusted for Italy’s higher levels of solar energy). 
 175.  See id. (noting that, as of July 9, 2011, Italy’s new tariffs were at least fifty 
percent greater than the current tariffs in Germany); see also Paul Gipe, Italy 
Abandons RPS, Adopts System of Feed-In Tariffs, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD 
(Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/12/ 
italy-abandons-rps-adopts-system-of-feed-in-tariffs (noting that, despite the rapid 
cuts in payment for solar-PV generation, the installation rate remains high).  
 176.  See Fulton et al., supra note 44, at 8, 18 (updating proposals to reduce the 
subsidies for FITs by approximately six percent per four-month period). 
 177.  See id. at 18 (adding that the decline would be spread out across four-
month periods, with six percent FIT declines in each period, translating to 2011 
subsidies of €0.28/kWh for large-scale projects and €0.38/kWh for small-scale 
applications). 
 178.  See id. at 4 (stating that the Italian Government might adjust the tariff rates 
as prices fall). 
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significantly less profit for generators.179 Experts even indicate that 
renewable energy sources in Italy are close to grid-parity with fossil-
fuel sources, positing that large-scale investments in solar-PV-
generated electricity are becoming increasingly unnecessary.180 As 
the Italian wholesale electricity market continues to evolve, investors 
are looking toward smaller, more affordable solar-PV generators, 
which are more efficient and less costly than ground-mounted, large-
scale generators.181 Ideally, the smaller, more efficient solar-PV 
generators should drive down the base tariff rate at which solar-based 
electricity is purchased in the wholesale market. 
Italy recognizes the trajectory of its solar-PV energy market, and 
in accordance with that trajectory, it is lowering its tariff rates 
through various mechanisms to render its FIT Program more 
efficient and much less remunerative in the marketplace. Prices 
continue to fall for newly-installed solar-PV generators,182 and even 
though generators already in operation will not be affected by price 
degressions,183 the Italian Government has pared down its financial 
 
 179.  See Christian Roselund, 2012 Solar PV Year in Review: A Complex 
Picture of a Changing Market, SOLARSERVER (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-report/solar-report/2012-solar-
pv-year-in-review-a-complex-picture-of-a-changing-market.html (reporting that 
continuing global oversupply of solar-PV energy induced a collapse in PV prices, 
leading to negative profit margins). 
 180.  See Becky Stuart, The Rules of the Game, PV MAGAZINE (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.pv-magazine.com/archive/articles/beitrag/the-rules-of-the-game-
_100005931/86/?tx_ttnews%5BbackCat%5D=196&cHash=cf2f8c76afe0f61deacc
7e9b0b8622c2 (stating that Italy—particularly southern Italy—may reach grid-
parity by 2013 because of lower component and procurement costs). 
 181.  See id. (noting that the large-scale, ground-mounted plants are less of a 
target for investment than rooftop systems in the retail and domestic markets 
because of the potential return on investment); see also Italian Solar Generation, 
supra note 17 (indicating that, in 2011, “one-third of Italy’s total solar capacity 
was installed by homeowners, farmers, and small businesses,” and ninety-seven 
percent of solar-PV systems used in Italy are less than 200 kW in size). 
 182.  See Mario Ragwitz et al., Recent Developments of Feed-In Systems in the 
EU: A Research Paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation, INT’L FEED-IN 
COOPERATION 1, 9–10 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.feed-in-
cooperation.org/wDefault_7/content/research/index.php (explaining that tariff 
degressions can provide incentives for technology improvements and for cost 
reductions); see also Klein et al., supra note 42, at 43 (stating that, in 2007, tariff 
degression for Italian FITs for solar-PV plants amounted to reductions of two 
percent annually). 
 183.  See Ragwitz et al., supra note 182, at 9–10 (noting that price degressions 
only affect newly-constructed solar-PV generators). 
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support for renewable energy generation significantly as it tackles its 
sovereign debt crisis.184 Seeking an alternative to its FIT Program, 
Italy has instituted a net-metering program that allows its solar-PV 
generators to consume at least some of the electricity that the 
generators produce instead of feeding all of the electricity into the 
grid, which reduces the base tariff according to the portion of 
electricity that the generators consume.185 Recognizing that Italy will 
invest less in renewable energy, some utility companies have moved 
to implement projects in developing countries.186 
Considering the shift in the Italian market toward smaller solar-PV 
generators, the steps taken by the Italian Government to degress its 
FITs, and the net-metering program that Italy has instituted, the 
Panel may not find that the Italian FIT Program provides solar-PV 
generators with more than adequate remuneration for their costs of 
capital. As a result, the FIT Program would not confer a “benefit” 
under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, and it would not 
constitute a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the prospective WTO Panel finds that the Italian FIT DCR is 
inconsistent with the obligations set forth in the TRIMs Agreement 
and the GATT 1994, Italy should respond by using the avenues 
established in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. First, 
Italy should appeal the Panel’s adverse ruling to the Appellate Body, 
which may overrule the Panel and find that the FIT DCR qualifies 
 
 184.  See Mark Scott, In Europe, Green Energy Takes a Hit From Debt Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/business/energy-
environment/in-europe-green-energy-takes-a-hit-from-debt-crisis.html?_r=1& 
(reporting that leading utilities and independent energy projects seek markets 
abroad for renewable energy projects as European governments, overwhelmed by 
debts, have cut subsidies from six billion euros in 2012 to five hundred million 
euros in 2013). 
 185.  See Ragwitz et al., supra note 182, at 11 (explaining that under the Italian 
net-metering scheme, producers do not receive direct remuneration for excess 
electricity fed into the grid, but rather an exchange of the value of electricity 
already consumed); see also Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (explaining 
that, in 2013, under the Fourth Conto Energia, any portion of the electricity that is 
used to offset on-site consumption receives a reduced “net-metering” tariff). 
 186.  See Scott, supra note 184 (noting that Enel Green Power has shifted its 
focus to new markets in the developing world—like Brazil and South Africa—
after paring back its anticipated renewable energy projects in Europe). 
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for the exception provided in Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994. 
Second, if the Appellate Body affirms the Panel Decision, Italy 
should eliminate the DCR from its FIT Program to comply with its 
obligations under the TRIMs Agreement and the GATT 1994. Last, 
Italy should consider discontinuing its FIT Program altogether and 
implementing another renewable energy program given Italy’s 
current economic downturn and the weight of sovereign debt on 
Italy’s budget. 
A. ITALY SHOULD APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE BODY THE 
OUTCOME OF THE PANEL DECISION 
Under Articles 16.4, 17.4, and 17.6 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, parties to an original dispute may appeal to an 
Appellate Body concerning the issues of law arising out of a Panel 
Decision.187 As such, the Appellate Body may adopt the Panel’s 
reasoning or strike it down as misapplied188 within at least two to 
three months.189 Italy may wish to appeal its Panel Decision to the 
Appellate Body; if it does, it will likely need to refute arguments 
made by China that the FIT Program confers a “benefit” under 
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. Given that Canada – 
Measures is the first case in which either the panel or the Appellate 
Body has interpreted Article III:8(a),190 Italy should request that the 
Appellate Body support its interpretation of the term “products” and 
the need for a competitive relationship between the products at issue, 
as this interpretation is not grounded in any other portion of the 
GATT 1994 or previous Panel or Appellate Body Reports. Italy also 
should request that the Panel complete the three-step analysis 
required as part of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.191 
 
 187.  See DSU arts. 16.4, 17.4, 17.6 (providing parties the right to appeal the 
Panel Decision within sixty days but limiting the appeal to the legal issues covered 
by the panel). 
 188.  See id. art. 17.13 (establishing that the Appellate Body may uphold, 
modify, or reverse the conclusions of the panel). 
 189.  See id. art. 17.5 (providing that, as a general rule, the proceedings shall not 
exceed sixty days unless the Appellate Body requires more time). 
 190.  Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.54. 
 191.  See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.122–7.124, 
7.129, 7.146–7.147 (asking whether (1) the DCR may be characterized as “laws, 
regulations, or requirements governing procurement;” (2) the “challenged measure 
involve[d] procurement by governmental agencies;” and (3) the governmental 
agencies undertook the procurement “for governmental purposes and not with a 
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Likely, Italy also would need to refute China’s argument that the 
above-average prices of solar-based electricity in the Italian 
wholesale market signify that the electricity is being sold for more 
than adequate remuneration.192 Italy would need to verify that its 
steps to regress its FITs and to downsize its FIT Program have 
reduced remuneration back to market level.193 If the Appellate Body 
finds that the measures taken to reduce the price of solar-based 
electricity in the Italian wholesale market have not reduced 
remuneration to market level, it may overturn the Panel’s ruling and 
find that the Italian FIT Program conferred a “benefit” to Italian 
solar-PV generation companies under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement. 
B. ITALY SHOULD ELIMINATE THE DCR COMPONENT OF ITS FIT 
PROGRAM TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE III:4 OF THE 
GATT 1994 AND ARTICLE 2.1 OF THE TRIMS AGREEMENT 
In the event that the Appellate Body affirms the Panel Decision, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body likely will request that Italy 
remove the DCR from its FIT Program.194 At a Dispute Settlement 
Board (“Board”) meeting thirty days after the date of adoption of the 
Panel Decision, the Respondent likely will inform the Board of its 
intention to implement any recommendations.195 
Notably, if Italy disregards the recommendations made by the 
Panel, China may decide to suspend concessions and raise barriers to 
entry against imports from the European Union.196 China may also 
 
view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for 
commercial sale”). 
 192.  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 193.  But see Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (emphasizing that, despite 
reports that the new Italian FIT program dramatically cuts tariffs, as of 2011 the 
tariffs remained fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs when 
adjusted for high levels of solar radiation energy). 
 194.  See DSU arts. 8, 19(1) (explaining that the Appellate Body will 
recommend that the Respondent bring the measure into conformity with the 
covered agreements and will suggest ways to do so). 
 195.  See id. art. 21(3) (adding that the Board will provide the party whose 
measure is in violation of the agreements with a reasonable amount of time in 
which to come into compliance). 
 196.  See id. art. 22(2) (allowing the injured party to request to suspend its 
concessions only after rounds of negotiations with the Respondent have failed); cf. 
WTO Rules Ontario Green Energy Tariff Unfair, supra note 14 (reporting that 
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request that a second panel be established to measure Italy’s 
compliance with the Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendations, 
and if the panel finds that Italy has failed to comply with the 
recommendations, China may request money damages from Italy.197 
Noncompliance should not be an option for Italy, however, as it may 
spark a trade war between two major trade partners—namely the 
European Union and China—who likely wish to maintain amicable 
trade relations with one another.198 
C. ITALY SHOULD DISCONTINUE ITS FIT PROGRAM AND 
IMPLEMENT ANOTHER RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRAM 
Because of the current economic downturn, Italy may choose to 
discontinue its FIT Program altogether and implement another 
renewable energy program. As electricity produced from solar-PV 
energy becomes more self-sustaining and grows closer to reaching 
grid-parity with fossil-fuel energy, Italy may conclude that FIT 
support is either unnecessary or unsustainable.199 Italy’s FIT Program 
has increased substantially the level of solar-PV energy in the Italian 
market,200 but the costs of the Program have become burdensome for 
the Italian budget.201 
 
even though a WTO ruling is non-binding against the party in violation of WTO 
rules, the complainant may implement tariffs against the party in violation). 
 197.  See DSU art. 21(5) (“Where there is disagreement as to the existence or 
consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to 
these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the 
original panel.”). 
 198.  See David J. Unger, While Solar Booms, a Trade Row Intensifies, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 10, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
Environment/Energy-Voices/2012/1110/While-solar-booms-a-trade-row-
intensifies (reporting that “tit-for-tat escalations” over solar panels are not helping 
to avoid a full-blown trade war). 
 199.  See Michael Ruoff et al., European Solar Markets: There Is Life After 
Feed-in Tariffs, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, INT’L NEWS: FOCUS ON ENERGY, 
no. 2, 2012, at 8, available at http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/1aa3ab69#/ 
1aa3ab69/8 (acknowledging that grid-parity is close in European countries with 
high insolation and high electricity prices). 
 200.  See Did Italy Install Two or Seven GW in 2010?, RENEWABLES INT’L (Jan. 
26, 2011), http://www.renewablesinternational.net/did-italy-install-two-or-seven-
gw-in-2010/150/510/30021/ (noting that while Germany had installed a record 
seven to eight gigawatts (“GW”) of photovoltaics in 2009, Italy also may have 
installed close to that number of gigawatts). 
 201.  See Ruoff et al., supra note 199, at 9 (noting that because the price for the 
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If, as experts claim, renewable energy sources are reaching grid-
parity with traditional energy sources, then certain EU Member 
States may no longer need FITs as a high-level incentive.202 As an 
alternative, solar-PV generation companies may enter into power-
purchase agreements in which large utilities and industrial customers 
are prepared to agree on power prices that are higher than current 
electricity prices.203 In this light, Italy may gradually phase out its 
FIT Program by continuing to pare down tariffs to more sustainable 
levels.204 
V. CONCLUSION 
A ruling by the prospective WTO Panel that Italy’s DCR violates 
the national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994 and Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMS Agreement would be 
consistent with WTO jurisprudence.205 Yet, a ruling that the FIT 
Program itself does not constitute a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the 
SCM Agreement would reshape WTO jurisprudence.206 If the FIT 
Program remains consistent with the WTO covered agreements and 
continues to encourage the growth of solar-PV generation, it may 
 
sale of electricity in Italy grew from ninety euros to one hundred euros in 2011, 
and the price will only rise in the future, the FIT has become less relevant and less 
viable than self-consumption or direct sale); cf. Scott, supra note 184 (discussing 
Italy’s drastic cuts in public subsidies). 
 202.  See “We No Longer Need Feed-in Tariffs”, RENEWABLES INT’L (Jan. 21, 
2013), http://www.renewablesinternational.net/ we-no- longer- need- feed-in- 
tariffs/150/510/59834/ (opining that because Europe has reached grid-parity with 
nuclear and coal power, the PV industry no longer needs feed-in tariffs). 
 203.  See Ruoff et al., supra note 199, at 9; “We No Longer Need Feed-in 
Tariffs”, supra note 202 (hypothesizing that, starting in 2013, solar markets will 
focus less on feed-in tariffs and more on direct consumption and power trading). 
 204.  See Italian PV Market Set for Disaster as New Incentive Budget Could Be 
Blown, PV MARKET RESEARCH (July 23, 2012), 
http://www.pvmarketresearch.com/press-
release/Italian_PV_Market_Set_for_Disaster_as_New_Incentive_Budget_Could_b
e_Blown/5 (reporting that the three GW of installations completed through the 
Fifth Energy Bill raised the annual cost of incentives and reduced the budget for 
plants).  
 205.  See Wilke, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that a finding by the WTO Panel 
that the “Buy-Ontario” clause is illegal under WTO law “would not be news to 
trade law experts”). 
 206.  See id. (highlighting that a ruling on the subsidy question would clarify 
outstanding legal questions and introduce greater legal certainty). 
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allow Italy to reach its renewable energy goal by 2020207 and reduce 
its FIT rates even more drastically than the current degressions have 
allowed.208 Italy need only decide whether it will continue to rely 
upon FITs as an important policy tool and to what extent it will fund 
FITs in the future.209 
 
 
 207.  Cf. Italy to Cut Renewable Energy Subsidies, UNITED PRESS INT’L (April 
2, 2012, 6:30AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/ EnergyResources/2012/ 
04/02/Italy-to-cut-renewable-energy-subsidies/UPI-52381333362600/ (stating that 
because Italy produces forty-one GW of electricity from solar-PV energy and has 
360,000 active plants, it could reach its goal of 29.4%). 
 208.  See id. (reporting that FITs have generated a burden on taxpayers and, with 
the boom, the Italian Government will likely cut FIT tariffs because it would have 
to pay out $59 billion over the next twenty years). 
 209.  Cf. Roselund, supra note 179 (“Falling prices mean that PV energy is 
becoming cost-competitive without subsidies.”). 
